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Export-Import Theory and the Racialization of Antisemitism: 
Turkish- and Arab-only Prevention Programs in Germany 
Esra Özyürek 
European Institute, London School of Economics 
e.g.ozyurek@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 Since the turn of the twenty-first century remembering the Holocaust and fighting against 
antisemitism emerged as the connected centerpieces of European identity. In 2000 European 
leaders signed the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust and 
pledged to “remember the victims [of the Holocaust] who perished, respect the survivors still 
with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration to mutual understanding and justice.”A 
Members also promised to “uphold the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny 
it.”B Three years later the same European leaders committed to “intensify efforts to combat 
antisemitism in all its manifestations.” They declared that antisemitism “has assumed new forms 
and expressions, which […] pose a threat to democracy, the values of civilization and therefore, 
to overall security in the OSCE region and beyond” (Berlin Declaration 2003).C 
 German historian Aledia Assmann’s words attest to the deservingly celebratory nature 
with which this development is received in Germany: “fifty-five years after the liberation of 
Auschwitz, there was agreement that the murder of six million European Jews should become a 
common memory, and, in turn, that this memory should inform the values of a European society 
and serve as a reminder of the obligation to protect the rights of minorities” (2006, 13). In this 
article I focus on the flip side of this otherwise deeply meaningful development. Despite 
                                                          
A
 https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration 
B
 ibid 
C
 http://www.osce.org/cio/31432?download=true 
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Assmann’s assessment that embracing Holocaust memory serves as a “reminder of the obligation 
to protect the rights of minorities,” I show how in practice the interconnected commitments of 
European leaders to remember the Holocaust and fight antisemitism became one of the grounds 
for legitimizing racialization of immigrants and specifically Muslims, by singling them out as the 
main contemporary antisemites.  
In Germany researchers consistently find that 25 – 27 percent of the population hold 
antisemitic
D
 (and 50 percent hold anti-Muslim) prejudices.
E
 According to annual police reports, 
of the hundreds of anti-Semitic crimes, mostly directed against Jewish cemeteries and buildings, 
more than 90 percent are committed by right-wing Germans. Since the beginning of the Second 
Intifada in 2000, and every time the conflict between Israel and Palestinians intensified, many 
Muslim Europeans, along with other non-Muslim activists, took part in anti-Zionist 
demonstrations and numerous times crossed the line towards antisemitism. To date, however, no 
study has proven that Muslim-background Germans are significantly more antisemitic than non-
Muslim Germans. The most comprehensive study to date shows that 29 % of Muslims in 
Western Europe hold antisemitic prejudices. Although not a figure to be dismissed by any 
standards, it is important to note that it is only 2 points higher than the German average (27%) 
and much lower than the countries of origin in the Middle East and North Africa (74%).
F
 In other 
words, the prejudices European Muslims hold show that in terms of their values they are part and 
parcel of the European society in which they live, even when they are not recognized as such. 
While reports produced by the German government recognize the lack of evidence for higher 
                                                          
D
 This number puts Germany ahead of more than half of other nations in the European Union. 
See Anti-Defamation League, The ADL Global 100: An Index of Antisemitism, 
http://global100.adl.org/. 
E
 For the discussion of different studies whose findings were similar, see Germany, 
Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 54-58. 
F
 http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope 
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rates of antisemitism among Muslims, the new wave of the fight against antisemitism is mostly 
focused on Muslims. Government-issued reports including “Antisemitism in Germany”G and 
millions of Euros allocated to combat antisemitism are directed almost exclusively to Muslims.  
This article begins with the discussion of a decade and half long effort dedicated to 
defining the uniqueness of antisemitism and especially its difference from anti-Muslim racism. I 
show how this effort went hand in hand with singling out Muslims as the main carriers of 
antisemitism in Germany and throughout Europe. By looking at government-issued reports and 
education programs I demonstrate how this campaign depicts Muslims as outsiders to German 
society, evaluates their antisemitism as more dangerous than that of right-wing German 
nationals, and attributes culturally-transmitted psycho pathologies that make different Muslim 
nations prone to antisemitism.
H
 Through such specific mechanisms the new wave of the struggle 
against antisemitism depicts a new Europe, and a new Germany specifically, that fully liberated 
itself from any antidemocratic tendencies surviving from its Nazi past; locates antisemitism as a 
problem located outside Europe; and obscures connections between antisemitism and anti-
Muslim racism, both active forces in mainstream German society.   
   
 
 
 
The Brief History of “Muslim antisemitism” 
                                                          
G
  
H
 The research for this project was conducted over five years, between 2009 and 2014. In 
addition to reading government issued reports and calls for projects, it included participant 
observations of numerous antisemitism prevention programs devoted to Muslims developed by 
five different non-governmental organizations all receiving money from the earmarked sources 
from the government. Most of the research was conducted in Berlin, with several trips to towns 
and cities outside Berlin.  
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The concept of Muslim antisemitism became a public concern not only in Germany but 
throughout Europe, and for that matter in the United States, after 2000. When the failure of the 
Oslo Peace Accords led to the Second Intifada in Palestinian territories and mobilized 
sympathizers through Europe in protests against Israel that had antisemitic overtones, and at 
times was outright anti-Semitic, an alarmist discourse accused Muslims of a new antisemitism 
(Taguieff 2004).
I
 European leaders, who a couple of years before had signed the Stockholm 
Declaration, met in 2003 in Vienna for a first Europe-wide meeting committed to fighting 
antisemitism and focusing on its uniqueness. More than 450 representatives from 55 OSCE 
member states participated the meeting to address the fact that “antisemitism is surging in the 
world to an extent unprecedented since the end of World War II.”J The participants also stressed 
that this antisemitism was new: “antisemitism in Europe today is not a history lesson, but a 
current event” and had a different source: “at the root of [today’s] anti-Jewish efforts is the same 
kind of extremist [i.e. Islamist] thinking that lies behind the international terrorism that is 
threatening our civilization.”K Or, more obviously stated, their concern was: “antisemitism 
coming out of the Arab and Islamic world.”L  The Vienna meeting was followed up in Berlin in 
2004, where participants declared this meeting as “an end to European denial of antisemitism.” 
There European governments agreed to allocating funds to combat this “new” form of 
antisemitism, believed to be brought to Europe in the suitcases of newcomers, namely, 
immigrants from Muslim majority countries. 
Two major developments that split political actors on what kind of a stance to take 
regarding the Second Intifada, as well as rising anti-Zionism and antisemitism, formed the 
                                                          
I
 Other scholars including Brian Klug 2004 and Brian Silverstein 2008 have been critical of this 
discourse and pointed out the politically motivated aspects of this alarmism. 
J
 http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html 
K
 http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html 
L
 http://archive.adl.org/anti_semitism/conference_vienna.html 
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background of the 2003 Vienna and 2004 Berlin meetings on antisemitism. The first was the 
unfortunate failure of the 2001 United Nations “World Conference Against Racism” in Durban, 
South Africa, based mainly on disagreement as to how to react to the escalating Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. During the conference, Arab countries drafted a resolution criticizing Israel 
and likening Zionism to racism. In the draft proposal they accused Israel of being a “racist 
apartheid state” and committing “crimes against humanity” including “genocide and ethnic 
cleansing” of Palestinians.M In response, Israeli and U.S. American representatives walked out of 
the meetings, and European leaders also refused to sign the resolution.
N
 Another controversial 
issue during the same conference was the question of slavery. In this meeting, a group of African 
countries asked for an apology and reparations from all countries that were involved in slavery, 
based on the same model that payments were given to Jewish survivors and offspring of victims 
of the Holocaust. The United States from the beginning showed its reluctance to engage this 
topic by contributing only a minimal amount to the conference and keeping its representation to 
the minimum (Maran 2002). The European countries agreed to increase aid to Africa but they 
refused to consider reparations. Both events led to a split between the affluent and white global 
North, on the one hand, and poor and brown and black South, on the other, in the way they 
approach issues relating to racism and discrimination.  
The recent European commitment to intensify the fight against antisemitism, and the split 
at a UN meeting devoted to racism between Western countries, on the one hand, and Middle 
Eastern and African countries, on the other, led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to organize the above mentioned conference in Vienna specifically focusing on 
antisemitism. The OSCE is a product of the 1975 Helsinki process, which aimed to promote 
                                                          
M
 http://archive.adl.org/durban/durban_ngo.html 
N
 The conference continued a full day beyond schedule and a compromise resolution was written 
between European and Arab states, facilitated by South Africa that did not include anti-Israel 
language. http://archive.adl.org/durban/default.html 
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human rights and democracy in Cold War Europe. In a unified Europe, the OSCE played the 
leading role in fighting antisemitism, first in the Baltic counties and central Europe and then in 
Western Europe. The fifty-five nations participating in the organization include European 
countries, the successor states of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada. The 2003 
Vienna Conference is significant for being the first international attempt to focus uniquely on 
antisemitism. Jewish delegates to a 2003 Warsaw meeting of the OSCE held in preparation for 
the Vienna Conference argued, European states had only recently grasped that antisemitism was 
a “mutating virus that comes from different and new directions.” They stated that some Jewish 
communities felt less threatened by the racist Far Right and more so by the “spillover of tensions 
from the Middle East” (Weiner 2004). Participants in the Vienna conference defined the specific 
qualities of antisemitism as conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, anti-Zionism, and belief in the 
imagined power of the Jews (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 137).  
Press releases of the Vienna meeting show how fighting against antisemitism was defined 
as a central value of the recently enlarged Europe. In his opening speech, the Bulgarian foreign 
minister and future chairman of the OSCE Solomon Isaac Passy said: “We understand that ‘zero 
tolerance’ to any form of intolerance, including antisemitism is a key part of our role in 
international relations and of our share in the [European] integration processes.” He added that it 
was through international institutions such as the OSCE that the “strong common will of 
mankind [worked to] bring an end, once and for all, to the tragic and powerful legacy of World 
War II and the Cold War. The common commitment is the basis of integration in the Euro-
Atlantic area and its only possible future. Antisemitism is not part of this future” (20 June 2003 
press release) 
A year later in 2004 the German government organized a follow-up conference in Berlin 
that also uniquely focused on antisemitism. In the opening speeches the fingers were directed at 
Muslim immigrants. For example Abraham Foxman, the director of Anti-Defamation League 
said “Islamist campaigns within the Muslim world and Europe have moved the anti-Jewish 
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beliefs within Islam from the fringes, where they historically resided, closer to the center.”O The 
Berlin Conference was preceded by a workshop organized by the American Jewish Committee 
that focused on education to combat antisemitism. Workshop participants asserted that Holocaust 
education is not fit for the purpose and that education must focus on different events; educators 
had to confront antisemitism among Muslim communities and antisemitic forms of Israel critique 
(Whine 2004). The Berlin declaration called the new version of antisemitism a threat to 
democracy, civilized values, and security in the OSCE region (Germany, Bundesministerium des 
Innern 2011, 136–37).  By the way it defines new antisemitism as antithetical to democracy, 
civilized values, and interests of the OSCE region, this declaration reveals that the issue in 
question is seen as exterior to the Western civilization to which the majority of OSCE countries 
belong. It is noteworthy that in Vienna and in Berlin, birthplace of the worst modern form of 
antisemitism, immigrants were accused of bringing antisemitism to a Europe imagined to be 
otherwise free of it. Antisemitism was now seen as the mind-set of an external enemy that 
threatened European civilization and security. This “new” mind-set attributed to immigrants was 
distinguished from all other forms of xenophobia, racism, and discrimination common in 
contemporary Europe and made these seem like not significant threats to democracy, civilization, 
or security.  
Simultaneously with the Berlin declaration, a plea to combat the new/Muslim antisemitic 
wave was launched. Already in 2002 and 2003, the German Ministry of the Family had funded 
the Center for Democratic Culture in Berlin to write a report about antisemitism, homophobia, 
and gender discrimination among Muslim immigrants. In 2002, the Taskforce Education on 
Antisemitism was formed as a network of experts, “due to the insight that previous educational 
approaches regarding topics like racism, and methods—in the tradition of general Human Rights 
education—did not do justice to the specific challenges in the field of antisemitism and the 
                                                          
O
 http://archive.adl.org/osce/default_osce_ahf.html#.VD-7vhZwqLB 
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development of possible educational actions against it.”P In 2004, the Antisemitism Research 
Center in Berlin wrote a report pointing to residents with Muslim backgrounds as responsible for 
current expressions of antisemitism in Germany (Bunzl 2007).  Between 2002 and 2005, an 
organization called Bildungs Bausteine gegen antisemitismus developed material to combat 
antisemitism among Muslims with funding from the German federal government’s Entimon 
program. In 2003, the Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus (KIgA), a civil society 
initiative, and then, in 2004, Amira—Antisemitismus im Kontext von Migration und 
Rassismus—were established specifically to combat antisemitism in Muslim communities. KIgA 
identifies its agenda as “pedagogical work with Arabic, Turkish, and Moslem youth” and more 
specifically to develop models for curricular and extracurricular education, such as for after-
school programs.
Q
 Amira similarly defines its focus as “the antisemitism of youth migrants 
whose families come from Muslim countries” and developing projects that engage youth outside 
the school.
R
 Other existing organizations such as Antonio Amadeus Foundation, the American 
Jewish Committee, and many other smaller organizations began implementing programs to 
combat antisemitism among Muslims and received money from the international, federal, and 
local sources newly earmarked for the issue. Based on his analysis of public funding for 
programs against antisemitism, Frank Gruel (2010) states that in the 2000s antisemitism training 
for mainstream German youth was reduced dramatically and replaced by projects for Muslims. 
For example, the organization that established Amira, the Association for Democratic Culture in 
Berlin, established in 2003, originally focused on combating right-wing extremism among East 
                                                          
P
 www.european-forum-on-antisemitism.org/taskforce-education-on-
antisemitism/overview/?fontsize=0%2Fcontact.php 
Q
 Kiga-berlin.org/index.php?page=ueber-uns&hlsen_US 
R
 Amira-berlin.de/Aktuelles/35.html. Both organizations develop model projects. They 
implement them a few times before they publish their models. Staff from both organizations 
complained about how difficult it was to have to constantly develop new models, especially 
when they know the older models they developed were never becoming a permanent part of the 
curriculum. The only chance many programs had implementation was while being tried out. 
People who work in the field explained this to me as part of the general difficulty in Germany in 
incorporating multicultural education.  
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German youth, but by 2007, it concentrated exclusively on Muslim youth. Representatives of 
many other smaller youth based social work organizations told me that their focus had similarly 
changed from East Germans 1990s to Muslims in the 2000s, following shifting funding sources.  
In 2006, the German Ministry of the Family established an organization called Vielfalt tut 
gut: Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie (Diversity Does Good: Youth for Diversity, 
Tolerance and Democracy) with an annual budget of nineteen million euros.
S
 The organization 
calls for applications that will develop educational projects among “children and youth in danger 
of right-extremism” and “migrants” in order to strengthen democracy and examine “historical” 
and “contemporary” forms of antisemitism.T The official language itself makes it clear that 
“children and youth in danger of right extremism,” meaning East German youth, are seen as 
prone to “historical” antisemitism, while “migrants,” meaning Muslims, as predisposed to 
“contemporary” antisemitism.U By distinguishing between antisemitisms of locals and 
immigrants in temporal terms, the ministry gestures toward hierarchizing them in terms of the 
urgency of the threat they pose to society. Calling antisemitism committed by right-wing and 
hence nonimmigrant residents of Germany “historical” indicates that 90 percent of the crimes 
committed by this group are to be perceived as anachronistic, outmoded historical errors. Calling 
antisemitism among immigrants (almost always meaning not any other immigrants but only 
Muslims) “contemporary” points to an urgent danger it poses for the present and the future, and 
the need to find new ways to deal with it. 
                                                          
S
 The predecessor to this program, called Entimon, operated from 2001 to 2006 with a yearly 
budget of fifteen million euros and the motto “Together against Violence and Right-Extremism 
[Rechtextremismus].” The shift in the focus of the program from “right-extremism,” meaning 
East Germans, to one that includes migrants, meaning Muslims, is visible in the 2007 program. 
Beginning on January 1, 2011, this program was replaced by a parallel program called Toleranz 
Fördern—Kompetenz Stärken (Promoting Tolerance—Boosting Competence). The new program 
has the same goals.  
T
 http://www.toleranz-foerdern-kompetenz-staerken.de/das-
bundesprogramm/vorgaengerprogramme/vielfalt-tut-gut/ 
U
 www.tolerenz-foerdern-kompetenz-staerkern.de/tfks.vielfalt_tut_gut.html.  
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The new focus on the uniqueness of antisemitism and its independence from all other 
racisms found ramifications in scholarship as well. It is noteworthy that the greatest effort was 
spent to separate antisemitism, not from any other form of discrimination, but specifically from 
anti-Muslim hatred, or Islamophobia. Two German scholars based at the Moses Mendelssohn 
Center for European Jewish Studies in Potsdam state that Islamophobia and antisemitism are 
incomparable, because “antisemitism has motivated mass movements, declared Jews to be the 
‘enemies of mankind,’ and in the past and present forms, attributes to Jews global conspiracies, 
including hidden power, control over media and politics, the subterranean global destructions of 
societies . . . none of which [exist] even in the most radical forms of public anti-Muslim 
resentments” (Rensmann and Schoeps 2011, 52). Such a view promoting the idea that 
antisemitism sees Jews as more powerful than other humans, while all other racisms regard the 
racialized subjects as lower forms, is widespread among antisemitism experts in Germany.  
Jochen Müller, a leading expert on antisemitism among Muslims, has been active in 
promoting a total distinction between antisemitism and Islamophobia,  going so far as to contend 
that no one organization can fight against the two. In a piece he wrote entitled “Islamophobie 
und Antisemitismus—Kritische Anmerkenungen zu einem fragwürdigen Vergleich” 
(Islamophobia and Antisemitism: Critical Comments on a Questionable Comparison), he argues 
that it is wrong to assume that “the two forms of discrimination are just different because they 
focus on different forms of victims, one Jews and the other Muslims” (2009, 24). According to 
Müller, “Islamophobia is based on culturalistic ascriptions that are typical of the new forms of 
racism. . . . . Muslims and their religion are discriminated against in a colonialistic and racist 
manner as unenlightened, terrorist, and backward” but are not under the threat of being 
exterminated (ibid.). The problem with this view is that it does not recognize that antisemitism 
was not originally a policy of extermination, and that it is an ideology that took on different 
degrees and shades of meaning over the centuries, and has done so even in modern times. This 
view approaches all manifestations of antisemitism as equivalent to Nazism and hence makes 
any comparison between antisemitism and any other racism that is not genocidal untenable. 
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More problematically, and typical of antisemitism experts in Germany, Müller also adds that 
antisemitism is based on fantasy, whereas Islamophobia is based on reality:  
“Modern antisemitism is a worldview that works even without Jews. Independently of 
what Jews really do, antisemitism is based on the fiction of the Jew as conspirer. . . . . In contrast, 
in Islamophobia, single cases of terrorist Islamists are projected onto the entire Muslim 
community as the militance of Islam . . . . Islamophobia is based on distinct problems of this 
society, like integration, or images of integration, terrorism, and other questions. And these are 
related to Islam and the existence of Muslim minorities . . . . Islamophobia is not a simple 
projection of an experience of crisis on just any group. That is why we have to talk differently 
about real existing problems that are the basis of Islamophobia and how to deal with them. And 
that is the real difference with antisemitism” (Müller 2009, 27).  In other words, while 
recognizing that anti-Semitic prejudices are fictional, Müller insists that anti-Muslim ideas are 
based on real problems. In doing so, he reaffirms the Islamophobic arguments about what is 
believed to be wrong with Muslims and blames the victims of racism for discrimination against 
them.  
Comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia became such a contentious issue that when 
the then chair of Center for Antisemitism Research in Berlin, Wolfgang Benz, had organized a 
conference in 2008 with the title “Enemy Image of Muslim, Enemy Image of Jew” (Feindbild 
Muslim, Feindbild Jude) it was considered a scandal. The fact that the conference call, and an 
article Benz wrote in 2010 after he retired from his position, compared the exclusionary 
mechanisms of antisemitism from the 19
th
 century with that of today’s anti-Muslim sentiment 
was considered as an equation of antisemitism with Islamophobia and hence dismissing 
antisemitism and even relativizing the Holocaust.
V
 In this heated debated Benz and the 
                                                          
V
 After he retired, Dr. Benz wrote an article in the influential Suddeutsche Zeitung that discusses 
how Islamophobia works in similar mechanisms with antisemitism. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/antisemiten-und-islamfeinde-hetzer-mit-parallelen-1.59486. 
Along with many others his critics included German-Jewish intellectual Henryk Broder (2010), 
who accused of Broder for being “clueless,” 
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conference participants were attacked as scholars.
W
 Benz was even indirectly accused for being a 
Nazi by those who brought up the fact that his PhD advisor was a member of the Nazi party.
X
 
It is important to note that as late as in the 1990s – a particularly bad decade for 
immigrants in Germany -- it was not so impolitic to think about antisemitism and discrimination 
against Muslims together. Especially following the fire bombings of Turkish houses in 1992 in 
Mölln and in 1993 in Solingen, which killed several Turks, including one family of three 
generations, Turkish German activists began to attract public attention by likening their situation 
to that of the Jews. After the events, protestors carried banners that read, “We do not want to be 
the Jews of tomorrow” (Bodemann and Yurdakul 2006). After the 1992 fire bombings, the then 
leader of the West German Jewish community, Ignatz Bubis, said that there was no great 
difference between xenophobia and antisemitism (cited in Peck 2006, 91). Turkish German 
friends who attended school in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s have told me that in those days 
likening the experiences of immigrants to that of Jews in school classes was not uncommon.
Y
 
Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (2006) show that it was acceptable for Turkish German 
activists to draw such analogies all the way up to the year 2002, the tenth anniversary of the fire 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.welt.de/welt_print/debatte/article5828140/Sind-Muslime-die-Juden-von-heute.html, 
and Reinhard Mohr (2010) for lying about the reality of Islam, 
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/debatte-ueber-islamophobie-peinlicher-
aufklaerungsunterricht-a-672117.html and Kunzler for relativizing the Holocaust 
http://www.taz.de/!26952/ 
W
 For opinion pieces that attack the conference and participants see http://jungle-
world.com/artikel/2008/51/32312.html 
X
 
http://www.achgut.com/dadgdx/index.php/dadgd/article/ein_nazi_und_sein_schueler_karl_bosl_
und_wolfgang_benz/ 
Y
 Ruth Mandel notes that through her ethnographic research among Turkish communities in 
Germany in the 1990s she heard from many German Turks that they see themselves as “the new 
Jews of Germany” (Mandel 2008, 129) 
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bombings, and have their message sympathetically heard by members of the Jewish community, 
as well as indigenous German politicians.
Z
  
But in the 2000s, in a newly enlarged Europe that had awakened to anti-Zionist and 
antisemitic protests, just when reaching out to the memory of the Holocaust as the common 
identity that would unite all EU members, it was no longer acceptable for Turks or other 
Muslims to identify with murdered Jews. In 2008, Professor Faruk Şen, then director of the 
Center for Turkish Studies in Essen, had to resign from his post after he likened the experience 
of European Turks to that of European Jews a century ago. Ironically, Şen had written this article 
in a Turkish newspaper in order to criticize increasing antisemitism in Turkey as it was brought 
up in Turkey by Ishak Alaton, a Turkish Jewish businessman. In the article Şen wrote he directed 
his words to Alaton: “As European Turks we understand your importance for Turkey well. We, 
five million two hundred thousand [Euro Turks] with a similar destiny in Europe, the new Jews 
of Europe, can understand you the best. Do not feel sad because of anti-Semitic prejudice some 
groups in Turkey hold on to. As Turkish people and as new Jews of Europe we are on your 
side.”AA  This statement was considered outrageous in the German media, and numerous letters 
to the editor accused Şen of “defaming the German state” (Margalit 2009, 223).BB Even though 
he later apologized and tried to distance himself from what he had said, he was not able to retain 
his position. By that time, it was established that antisemitism was a unique form of hatred that 
could not be compared to any other, but especially anti-Muslim, racism. 
                                                          
Z
 Michal Bodemann and Gökçe Yurdakul (2006) interpret these analogies drawn by the Turkish 
community members as a strategy by which to instrumentalize the Jewish past so as to create 
public legitimacy for their demands against racism. What is important for the purposes of this 
essay is that in the 1990s, there was public space for such analogies, but this disappeared in the 
2000s. 
AA
 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/faruk-sen-die-tuerken-sind-die-neuen-juden-
1545658.html 
BB
 It is important to note that Dr. Şen had already become unpopular in 2006, when he denied 
that the Ottoman mass killings of Armenians in 1915 could be called genocide. Gökçe Yurdakul 
and Michal Bodemann (2010) argue that when he wrote this Turkish article, he was already 
unpopular in his organization, and that the board used this incident as an excuse to fire him. 
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The Export-Import Theory of Antisemitism 
 
Surprisingly, following a decade of talk about a new antisemitism attributed exclusively to 
Muslims, German specialists in the subject have more recently concluded that there is no 
antisemitism specific to Muslims. Nonetheless they continue to identify Muslim immigrants as 
the main disseminators of antisemitism. The German Ministry of the Interior’s 2011 report on 
Antisemitismus in Deutschland differentiates among seven different forms of antisemitism: 
religious (Christian), social (which defines Jews as usurers), political (which attributes to Jews a 
special power and a desire to rule the world), nationalist (which does not recognize the Jewish 
minority as part of the nation, but sees it as a disloyal enemy), racist (which believes that Jews 
belong to another group by reason of their racial characteristics and not of belief), secondary 
(which involves seeing Jews as guilty of what happened to them during the Shoah and confusing 
the victims with the perpetrators), and anti-Zionist (whose classic antisemitic stereotypes are 
concealed behind criticism of Israel). The authors concluded, however, that there was no separate 
“new,” Islamic antisemitism. “[W]hat were previously seen as new elements [in Muslim 
antisemitism] were actually already known” (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 
12). 
Such a conclusion about the lack of a specific “Muslim antisemitism” is the product of 
what I call the “export-import theory of antisemitism,” which is widely embraced among 
antisemitism specialists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Another trend that seeks for roots 
of distinct Muslim antisemitism in Islamic texts is still widespread in places like the United 
States, even though embraced mostly by right wing popular voices in the media or bona fide 
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scholars. They argue, “Jihad and Jew-hatred belong together” (Kunzel 2007, Patterson 2011)CC 
or talk about “an almost innate enmity the Prophet of Islam taught and practiced towards the 
Jews he encountered” (Israili 2009, ix). Promoters of this view typically ignore the historical 
context in which these statements in the Qur’an and Hadith were made, the fact that contrary 
statements can also be easily found in the same sources, and more importantly anti-Judaism 
never became an official policy and Jews had relatively better prospects in Muslim empires for 
hundreds of years (Barkey 2008, Cohen 2008). Over a dozen experts who wrote the 
Antisemitismus in Deutschland and many German scholars argue, instead, that antisemitism 
originated in Europe and was then exported to the Middle East—either through Christians in the 
case of the Ottoman Empire or through Nazis seeking collaboration with Muslim Arabs in the 
case, especially, of Palestinians. Then, it is argued, this European and especially German branded 
antisemitism was preserved completely intact in the Middle East from 1930s to 1970s while 
Europeans were coming to terms with and recovering from their own antisemitism. This 
exported antisemitism was then imported back to an otherwise antisemitism free Europe in the 
suitcases of post–World War II immigrants.  
The export-import theory is clearly expressed by Klaus Holz and Michael Kiefer in one 
of their frequently quoted articles: “Antisemitism in the Arab world, and in the Muslim world in 
general, is a European import in all its essential aspects. Modern European antisemitism was 
simply adapted to Islamic semantics and required no fundamental change. As Muslim 
populations were partially re-Islamized, with the associated worsening of religious 
fundamentalism in Europe, this variant of modern antisemitism was imported back to Europe” 
(2010, 109). The influential journalist and Islam expert Claudia Dantschke makes a parallel 
statement and claims that it was the European Christian missionaries who originally infected 
Muslims with antisemitism, and that their ideas were brought back to Europe after being 
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 Kunzel is a German scholar who is active in antisemitism debates in Germany. But his 
position was not embraced by the panel of antisemitism experts who wrote the Antisemitism 
Report in Germany.  
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incorporated by Islamists into their ideology: “The classic Islamist view sees the Jew as denying 
God and wanting to separate humans from God [so as] to rule them. Such stereotypes, formed by 
nineteenth-century anti-modern European clerical anti-Judaism, were transported by Christian 
communities to the Ottoman Empire, where they entered Muslim and Islamist discourse. [In this 
Muslim view,] having disempowered Christianity, Jews are [now] ready to do the same to Islam” 
(Dantschke 2009, 16),  
The export-import theory of antisemitism burdens European, and specifically German, 
shoulders with the invention of anti-Semitic ideas that now circulate around the world. At the 
same time, it implicates that in the period between export of antisemitism to the Middle East and 
its reimport, Europeans had eradicated it in Europe. That is how antisemitism could be seen as a 
“new” and “foreign” phenomenon in contemporary Europe and Germany. The notion of the lack 
of antisemitic sources in Europe and especially in Germany is so strong in this narrative that any 
report on antisemitism in Germany includes antisemitic writings in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, 
whether they are available in Germany or not.  It is argued that Germans with Muslim 
backgrounds who are not recent immigrants, but were born and raised in Germany, contract 
antisemitism from print media and satellite TV broadcasting from the Middle East. The 
underlying assumption is that it is otherwise impossible to be socialized in to anti-Semitic 
thinking in Germany. That is why more than half of Antisemitismus in Deutschland’s two 
hundred pages are devoted to antisemitism in the Turkish, Arabic (more specifically al-Manar, 
the official TV channels of Hezbollah and Hamas, both banned in Germany), and Iranian media. 
It is noteworthy that the report does not discuss immigration to Germany from other countries 
with high levels of anti-Semitic prejudice, including Greece (69%), Poland (45%), Bulgaria 
(44%), Serbia (42%), and Ukraine (38%).
DD
 More important, Antisemitismus in Deutschland 
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 Numbers are taken from the ADL Global 100, 2014 survey the Anti-Defamation League 
measured the Antisemitism Index of more than 100 countries. 
http://global100.adl.org/#map/eeurope 
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lacks discussion of the most significant source of antisemitism in Germany, namely, extreme 
right-wing, ethnically German political organizations and formations. 
The official Antisemitismus in Deutschland report, which contradicts itself multiple 
times, repeatedly emphasizes that the children of Muslim background immigrants do not actually 
follow the Turkish- or Arabic-language media of their parents’ homelands. Rather, they follow 
German media, and watch the same entertainment programs as their nonimmigrant fellow youth. 
In the report, there is even a discussion of how Turkish media are no longer relevant to German 
Turks. It is admitted that the sales of Turkish-language newspapers in Germany have been 
decreasing over the past few decades, and currently do not total more than 60,000 copies. This is 
probably because “the readers have no direct connection to Turkey. Additionally, the younger 
generations do not know the Turkish language well enough, and Turkish newspapers lack a 
connection to the reality of migrants in Europe” (Germany, Bundesministerium des Innern 2011, 
110). However, the report argues, the parents and grandparents of these young people follow the 
media from their homelands and then pass on the antisemitic ideas they acquire in this way to 
their children and grandchildren (ibid., 110) -- a proposition that is not supported by any 
evidence. This statement also seems counter intuitive since antisemitism among Muslims has 
never been an issue of public concern in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, or even 90s, when, according to this 
line of thinking, anti-Semitic tendencies should have been the strongest among immigrants 
freshly arrived from the Middle East. 
The argument, which denies that a distinct Muslim antisemitism exists, but nonetheless 
holds Muslims responsible for antisemitism in Europe in general and in Germany specifically, 
equates anti-Zionism with classic modern antisemitism, which was originally constructed partly 
on the idea that Jews lacked a nation-state of their own. In an influential essay discussing 
antisemitism and Islamophobia, Matti Bunzl stresses a major difference between the old 
antisemitism and the new, anti-Zionist version: “when young, disenfranchised Muslims attack 
French Jews, they do not do so in the interest of creating an ethnically pure France. Nor are they 
asserting that French Jews do not belong in Europe. On the contrary, they are attacking Jews 
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precisely because they see them as part of a European hegemony that not only marginalizes 
Muslims in France but from their point of view, also accounts for the suffering of Palestinians” 
(Bunzl 2005, 504). Bunzl points to the irony that the success of the Zionist ideal of Israel as a 
place where European Jews could have a safe haven is what puts European Jews under attack 
now. By doing so, he points out that the contemporary antisemitism Muslims are accused to hold 
on to is not a hermetically sealed Nazi ideology that Arabs inherited and dutifully pack in their 
suitcases wherever they go. Rather anti-Semitic prejudices and anti-Zionist stance of European 
Muslims are closely related to today’s political developments in the Middle East and part of 
European social life. 
 
Producing Nationality-Specific Antisemitisms 
 
Even though antisemitism experts in Germany often discuss Arabs and Turks together as carriers 
of the new wave of antisemitism, a careful analysis of reports and projects shows that different 
sources of the problem and cures for it are assigned to each of these national groups. Most of the 
antisemitism-prevention training I observed in Berlin was aimed at Arabs, and more specifically 
at Palestinian refugees, although without always naming them as such. As the largest group of 
Muslims in Germany, Turkish immigrants also receive considerable attention. Discourses and 
prevention methods regarding each group as well as the attitudes of trainers differed significantly 
for each ethnic group. Trainers I talked to mentioned that the groups were so different that it did 
not always make sense to keep them together. 
In nationality specific antisemitism prevention trainings, Turks are assumed to be 
suffering from a false “myth of tolerance”—a collective false sense that Turks have a history of 
good relations with Jews. Arabs are assumed to be suffering from a collective pathology of “self-
victimization” and “desire for pride.” Both groups are believed to have brought these hereditary 
ethno-pathologies from their homelands and to pass them from generation to generation without 
interruption. German social workers and educators try to break these pathologies by showing 
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young people of Turkish background that Ottomans and Turks have been intolerant toward 
Turkish Jews, and they try to convince those of Arab and specifically Palestinian background 
that they are not victims in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Antisemitism specialists and educators 
regard Kurds as not antisemitic, and even pro-Zionist. Some of them recommend that Kurds be 
included in the antisemitism prevention programs to serve as positive role models and have a 
positive influence on Arabs (Verein für Demokratische Kultur in Berlin, 2008, 6). 
 
Fighting Turkish Antisemitism: Demolishing Unknown Myths  
 
Amira was one of the first organizations dedicated to fighting antisemitism among Muslim 
immigrants in Germany. In line with the notion that immigrants bring their antisemitism with 
them in their suitcases, the Amira team started off, not by talking to young Germans with 
immigrant backgrounds, but instead by sending a team of researchers to Turkey. Their aim was 
to study Turkish antisemitism at its roots. The report produced by the team was published as a 
slick booklet entitled Antisemitismus in der Türkei (Antisemitism in Turkey), which begins with 
the following statement: “This brochure is prepared for all educators who during their work 
confront Turkish-background youth or adults who make antisemitic statements. It gives a 
perspective on the background and context of antisemitism in Turkey.” It is distributed free of 
charge at many events organized for trainers and educators who deal with antisemitism among 
young people with Muslim backgrounds in Germany.  
Because they assume the transmission of Turkish antisemitism to be strictly genealogical, 
the Amira team argues that it is crucial for educators who work with Turkish-background youth 
in Germany to know about the historical and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism in 
Turkey. They suggest that Turkish Germans are not only infected by Turkish antisemitism that 
their grandparents have passed on to them, but are also under the influence of contemporary 
antisemitic trends in Turkey through social contacts. “The hypothesis [behind the research] is 
that contemporary antisemitism in Turkey influences the Turkish migrant community in 
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Germany through mass media, the Internet, and transnational social contacts” (Amira 2009, 1). 
Since the document, typically of such reports on Turkish antisemitism in Germany, never 
discusses the social worlds in which Turkish Germans live in Germany. Clearly, they are 
assumed not to be under the influence of any social and ideological forces operative in German 
society. In other words, they are not seen as part of German society. 
Among other observers who write about an essentialized “Turkish antisemitism” is 
journalist and Islam expert Claudia Dantschke (2010), who also sees no distinction between 
antisemitism in Turkey and among Germans of Turkish background. In her work, she argues that 
Turkish antisemitism is influenced by Islam, the nationalist Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and leftist 
discourses among secularists, all carried from Turkey to Germany. The only proof that she offers 
to substantiate this seamless connection between Turkey and Germany is that some Turkish-
language antisemitic publications were sold in a traveling Turkish book exhibit that visited a 
Turkish-German mosque, and in a small Turkish-language bookstore in Kreuzberg in Berlin.
EE
 
Antisemitic publications are abundant in Turkey, but it is hard to imagine that a traveling Turkish 
book exhibit and the small Turkish-language bookstore in Kreuzberg would be influential 
enough to dominate the ideas of the three million Germans of Turkish background.
FF
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 Juliana Wetzel (2007) uses the same example that antisemitic books were sold at the Turkish 
bookstore in Kreuzberg to prove her point that we may assume that antisemitic ideas prevalent in 
Turkey are popular among Turks in Germany. She argues that these books and antisemitic 
satellite films influence both Turkish and Arab background youth. Elke Gryglewski (2010) 
argues against this widely held assumption and shows that young people with immigrant 
backgrounds usually watch the same television channels and shows as their ethnic German peers, 
and that they actually lack the linguistic skills to understand Turkish- or Arabic-language 
television programs. She claims that only during times of heightened political tension in the 
Middle East do young people with Muslim backgrounds watch Arab channels in order to see 
alternative images.  
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 This number is according to the 2011 census. File Migrationsberichtdes Bundesamtes für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung, Migrationsbericht 2012 
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Much of the recent wave of antisemitism-prevention trainings in Germany are built on 
the assumption of such seamless connections between antisemitism in Turkey and Turkish 
Germans in Germany. In 2006, KIgA developed a workshop for German educators who work 
with young people with Turkish backgrounds. The brochure prepared for the teachers states: 
“Paranoia, anti-Western resentments that hold the Western world and especially Americans and 
Jews responsible are very influential in the Turkish community. Conspiracy theories are not just 
part of the very radical currents such as extreme nationalists or Islamists but they are very 
popular in general” (KIgA 2006, 57). The report of the project written by the KIgA staff then 
confesses that “just a very small percentage of teenagers follow this debate”; however, it still 
argues “these ideas [which they do not follow] are still very important to them. Their parents and 
the officials of the nationalistic and Islamist organizations of immigrants receive their political 
arguments from their homeland . . . and pass it onto younger generations” (ibid.). 
Hence, KIgA proposes even if Turkish origin anti-Semitic ideas are not followed by 
Turkish German teenagers, it is nevertheless very important to relay them to German national 
teachers who teach Turkish background students. The brochure suggests that if the teachers 
know the arguments of “Turks,” they can deconstruct these beliefs and produce rational ways of 
thinking. KIgA especially encourages the teachers to learn about and then shatter the myth of 
Turkish tolerance toward Jews: “What is of utmost importance when dealing with [antisemitism 
among Turks] is questioning the myth that Jews were fully accepted and lived without 
discrimination under Islamic rule and especially under the Ottoman rulers. Such a perception of 
history challenges taking contemporary antisemitism seriously and fighting against it.” (ibid., 
57–58). Following this reasoning, teachers are indeed given the most horrific examples of 
statements that can be found in Turkey, irrespective of the fact that most German Turks are not 
typically exposed to such statements.  
The workshop begins by giving the participants a chance to discuss their experiences 
with their Turkish students and friends, hence already singling Turkish Germans out as different 
from other Germans, regardless of how long they have lived in Germany. I attended a KIgA 
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workshop for teachers who worked with students with Turkish and Arab backgrounds to fight 
against Islamism. When the workshop began with a question asking teachers about their 
experiences of Islam and Muslims, the teachers, mostly of ethnic German background, spent a 
long time enthusiastically telling stories that clearly were fueled either by their imaginations or 
their lack of understanding of the lives of their students. One teacher claimed that many of the 
Muslim girls in her school were traditionally married off at the age of eight, and that boys 
commonly went to Syria to fight for al-Qaeda—both are in fact very rare occurrences. When the 
workshop leader, who was of Turkish background, offered to tell them about Islamism, saying 
that it was important to know that only a small minority of Muslims in Germany can be 
considered as falling into this category, one teacher said “then we do not care about Islamism. It 
is Islam that we do not want in our classrooms.” Other teachers nodded, and another teacher said 
with a stern face, “You know, brothers telling sisters what to do, wearing headscarves, and that 
kind of stuff. That is what we do not want. Tell us about how we can do that.” When the trainer 
told them that there is actually religious freedom in Germany, and that they were not allowed to 
say that they did not want Islam in their schools, the teachers became tense and told the trainer 
that they were not getting what they had come there for. During a later conversation, the trainer 
told me that it was very common for teachers to come to antisemitism-prevention training 
courses offered by KIgA with very clear opinions as to how ill-suited their Turkish and Arab 
students were to the values of German society, and how unwilling the participating teachers were 
to question their own suppositions and prejudices.  
The second part of the antisemitism-prevention workshop is devoted to discrimination 
against Turkish Jews. The workshop discusses three events: the pogrom in Eastern Thrace in 
1934, the sinking of the Jewish refugee ship Struma by a Soviet submarine off the Black Sea 
coast of Turkey in 1942 after the Turkish government refused to allow the passengers to land, 
and the forced labor camps for Christians and Jews who could not pay extremely high taxes 
directed specifically at them in Turkey in 1942–44. The report of the workshop states that “these 
events are not well known in Turkey, but it is useful to know the historical developments [in 
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Turkey],” because “these events do not fit the picture that shows Jews always had a happy life in 
Turkey. Everybody thinks since the arrival of the Sephardic Jews in Ottoman times 500 years 
ago, all Jews always experienced tolerance. But the material shown to participants reveals 
different experiences—that of exclusion” (KIgA 2006, 59). The third part of the workshop deals 
with antisemitism in contemporary Turkish society and covers themes that relate to theories 
about crypto-Jews—the Dönme—ruling Turkey, Holocaust denial in Turkey, and comparing 
Israel to National Socialism.  
This very workshop was also taught to teenagers of Turkish background without success. 
It quickly became clear that the workshop materials, which consisted of texts from Turkish-
language newspapers had to be translated into German. But even then, having grown up in 
Germany and not in Turkey, the teenagers had a difficult time following the conspiracy theories 
involved. Trainers told me that young people of Turkish background in Germany are not well 
educated enough to understand newspaper articles, which was why they had stopped doing this 
workshop with them. I disagree, because the articles used in the workshop are all written in 
simple language and are geared toward poorly educated readers in Turkey. Rather, what young 
Turkish Germans lack is familiarity with the convoluted logic of Turkish conspiratorial thinking, 
to which they are not exposed growing up in democratic Germany.  
Needless to say, antisemitism does exist in Turkey and did in the past too. Latest Anti-
Defamation League survey shows 69% of Turks hold anti-Semitic prejudice, a number that puts 
it far ahead of Iran, with an index of 56%.
GG
 Especially since a race-based nationalism was 
embraced following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish Jews and the descendants of 
Jewish converts to Islam have been subjected to severe forms of discrimination (Baer 2013a, 
Bali 1999, Brink-Danan 2012, Guttstadt 2013). It is also true that a myth of tolerance with regard 
to Jews has been promoted by the Turkish government, especially in the 1990s, to counter the 
accusations regarding the Armenian Genocide (Baer 2013b). Still, all these facts do not justify 
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the essentialized understanding of Turkishness and more specifically of Turkish antisemitism 
that the training programs in Germany suffer from. Holding training sessions to sensitize Turkish 
German youth and their teachers to Turkish antisemitism by challenging commonly shared 
historical knowledge and public discussions in Turkey is, at its best, ignorant of the lives of 
Turkish German youth— and racist at worst. Further, it misses the opportunity of addressing the 
contemporary problem of antisemitism in Germany. 
In 2010, I interviewed participants in a Turkish-only Holocaust education project 
presented by the Wannsee Conference House. The group, consisting of twelfth-grade high-
school students, studied Turkish-German history and was taken to Turkey at the end of the 
program. The first site the group was taken to was the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, one 
of the two synagogues which was bombed in 2003, leaving 57 people dead and 700 wounded by 
Turkish Islamic terrorists with connections to al-Qaida. Students told me that they were really 
surprised to learn that Jews live in Turkey today, or for that matter, had ever lived in Turkey. 
Unaware of the long Jewish presence in Turkey, they were completely ignorant of the myth of 
Ottoman tolerance of Jews that is believed to beresponsible for antisemitism among this 
population. The trainer who worked with them for about a year for this project told me that she 
actually did not encounter anti-Semitic tendencies in the group. This specific group of fifteen 
students might not be completely representative, but as bright students at an academic track high 
school, it is safe to assume that the majority of the Turkish German population could not be any 
more informed about the realities and myths that relate to the Jews of Turkey. Ironically, it seems 
that without the translations and teaching of the organizations in Germany that seek to combat 
antisemitism, the antisemitic writings that appear frequently in Turkish-language media in 
Turkey would not be as readily available to Turkish German youth as the experts assume them to 
be. 
   
 Persuading Young Palestinians that they are not victims 
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If the “myth of tolerance” is the target of antisemitism prevention programs for Turks, the myth 
that is aimed to be broken for Arabs in general and Palestinians in specific is “self-
victimization.” Reports that explain Arab antisemitism frequently mention how they wrongly 
perceiving themselves as victims of Israel and the Western world. This pathological feeling is 
assessed as more dangerous than the Turkish one, because experts warn against the dangers of 
other Arabs and Muslims becoming infected with this allegedly mistaken sense of victimhood. 
This wrong feeling attributed to all Arabs was discussed in detail in a five-day conference in 
Berlin in 2006. “Strategies and Effective Practices for Fighting Antisemitism among People with 
a Muslim/Arab Background in Europe,” organized by an independent organization called the 
International Institute for Education and Research on Antisemitism. The conference was 
supported by most significant actors who support work against antisemitism, many of which 
receive funding from the German government, including the Remembrance, Responsibility, and 
the Future Foundation, the American Jewish Committee, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the 
Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, and the Community 
Security Trust.  
Gunther Jikeli, the main organizer of the conference, who also served as an advisor to the 
OSCE on combating antisemitism in 2011–12, argues that it is first and foremost Palestinians 
who see themselves as a “community of victims” in relation to the policies of Israel. This false 
psychology, according to him, combined with their “Arab culture characterized by desire for 
pride leads to antisemitism” (Jikeli 2007, 10). This kind of “self-victimization” Jikeli posits is 
accompanied by a feeling that the Western world is conspiring against the Arab and/or Muslim 
world. Such unjustified feelings, he argues, are then used by Islamists and Arab nationalists to 
spread their propaganda (ibid., 8). He and other participants of the conference find this feeling 
especially dangerous because, they contend, it has the ability to spread like a virus to other 
groups: first Palestinians, then other Arabs, and then other Muslims, but not non-immigrant or 
non-Muslim Germans. 
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According to another participant in the conference, Jochen Müller, the independent 
researcher who wrote the Amira report on Turkish antisemitism, this feeling of “self-
victimization” and “the desire for pride and power,” is not an effect of living in Europe as a 
marginalized subject, but rather “was and is imported to Europe by many [Arab] migrants from 
the region.” Furthermore “self-victimization” is a crucial part of an ideology of collective 
identity and is passed on from generation to generation” (Müller 2007, 36). This approach not 
only attributes pathological feelings to all Arabs worldwide but also sees ethnic groups and their 
feelings as unconnected with the social and political context in which they live. In this 
framework, the fact that Palestinian refugees lost their homes, live in precarious conditions, and 
are subjected to discrimination appear irrelevant to feelings attributed to them. Experts suggest 
that Palestinians specifically and Arabs in general victimize themselves for no good reason. 
Worse, they are said to carry along their pathological feelings and desires wherever they travel 
and even pass them on to other Muslims. 
Parallel with this perspective, training programs designed for Arabs and especially for 
Palestinians aim to show them that they are not victims in the Middle East conflict, but equal 
partners in it. Palestinian background Germans are provided with narratives that show them the 
“Israeli perspective”: that Israelis did not simply take their land, and that Palestinians 
collaborated with the Nazis and were thus on the side of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. 
Before discussing the training, it is important to identify the Palestinians who are the targets of 
the lion’s share of programs in the fight against the new antisemitism.  
Palestinians in Germany and especially in Berlin are a particular group, which has 
significantly different characteristics from other groups of Muslim background, such as Turks 
and other Arabs. Owing to their complicated legal status as refugees without a state, the actual 
number of Palestinians living in Germany is not known. Nikola Tietze (2006) reports that 
estimates vary wildly between 8,000 and 35,000. Most of them came to Germany fleeing from 
the violence they experienced in refugee camps in Lebanon in the 1970s. A considerable number 
of them first came to East Berlin, since East Germany did not require them to have visas, and 
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then moved to West Berlin. Thus many of them are refugees three or four times over. Since 
1985, Palestinian refugees have been registered as people with “unclear state belonging.” This 
complication in their registration not only makes them difficult to count but has also hindered 
their obtaining many basic rights given to other residents of the city. Palestinian refugees in 
Berlin were not able to work or use social services. Most members of this group are dependent 
on social aid from the state, have very low levels of education, and are in a precarious 
socioeconomic condition. To top it all, many who experienced violence suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorders. As a result, Palestinians in Berlin are a unique group who live in a 
distinctly precarious and marginal position and directly suffered from the Israel–Palestine 
conflict. The extent to which they may feel like victims is much more directly attributable to 
their refugee status and the difficult position they have had to endure for many years, first in 
Lebanon and then in Berlin, rather than a psycho-cultural inheritance.  
Over the past few years, KIgA developed a project with the title “Beyond Black and 
White: Timeline about the History and Images of History in the Middle East Conflict until 
1949.” The brochure for the project states that the aim is to discuss the history that preceded the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. They claim this is important because they want to 
“fight against problematic interpretations and views” that use images of history in order to make 
territorial claims. The common image they want to fight against is the idea that “Jews stole the 
land of Palestine from Arabs.” This training shows participants the history of the region with an 
emphasis on the fact that “over centuries different territories in the region were settled by Jews, 
Muslims, and other groups and that there has never been a Palestinian state that one can base 
their claims on” (KIgA 2013, 71).  
According to the brochure, the exercise seeks “to sensitize teenagers for change in society 
and to question historical narratives that are used to legitimize territorial claims.” In order to 
achieve this goal, the training program focuses on how the region was ruled by different groups; 
its population changed frequently, with different migrations and rulers; there were different 
populations, cultures, and religions; Jews and Muslims have been living there for a long time; 
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and there was never a single state on its own. “In other words, by showing the diversity of rulers 
and populations in the region and by emphasizing that there was never a historical Palestinian 
state, the training aims to deliver the idea that Israelis took land that belonged to Palestinians is 
not a legitimate one. But by the same token, the trainers do not question Israeli claims to 
legitimacy based on historical territorial claims.  
This historical narrative is followed by a time-line exercise that establishes that there are 
two sides to all events. The students are given a list of events that led to the establishment of 
Israel in 1948. They are asked first to put them in chronological order and then to mark if this 
event was good from Israeli perspective or from Palestinian perspective. The goal of this 
exercise, according to the brochure is to show that there are different Israeli and Palestinian 
perspectives on the events, and that the participants become aware of the complexity of the 
conflict. Hence, it is aimed Palestinian students see that there is no need to perceive themselves 
as victims and feel hostile towards Israel.  
 
Conclusion 
 In a continent laden with antisemitic history, public intellectuals and policy makers 
search the suitcases of immigrants to find the source of contemporary antisemitism. There is no 
question that immigrants arrive with their own memories, attitudes, and ideologies in general 
(Rothberg and Yildiz 2011) and about Jews in specific. But it is equally obvious that the 
European wardrobes into which immigrants place these beliefs and dispositions have never been 
completely cleansed of antisemitism. Furthermore, Muslim youth who are the main suspects in 
the imported antisemitism narrative actually never migrated to Europe. The antisemitism they 
might be holding on to is part and parcel of life in the major European cities in which they grew 
up. So, how do we explain the popularity of the suitcase metaphor or the export-import theory to 
explain contemporary antisemitism in Europe?   
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First and foremost, the recent discovery of what is termed Muslim antisemitism keeps the 
fight against antisemitism alive in Europe. Seventy years after the Holocaust that annihilated two 
thirds of the continent’s Jews and after a decades-long struggle to de-Nazify and democratize 
German society, research consistently shows that one of every four Germans and one of every 
three European Union nationals still harbors antisemitic prejudice.
HH
 In a democratic Germany 
that bases its principles on the negation of National Socialism, fighting antisemitism is central to 
German identity. The new campaign brings antisemitism to the center of attention, renews an 
EU-wide consensus about the malevolence of anti-Jewish hatred, and defines combating it as a 
European value. It shows the world that Europe in general, and Germany in particular, is still 
very sensitive to and intolerant of antisemitism.  
 At the same time, putting the focus of the antisemitism prevention campaign on Muslims 
shifts the blame to relative newcomers to European society, who are still commonly called 
“foreigners” (auslander) in Germany. Accusing immigrants, or rather the grandchildren of 
immigrants, of having imported antisemitism to the continent effectively hides non-immigrant 
European and German antisemitism. Despite the heightened attention paid to antisemitism and 
Holocaust memory in Germany, observers concur that increasing numbers of Germans report 
being weary of hearing about the Holocaust and no longer want to feel guilty (Margalit 2010, 
Markovits 2006). Indeed, a 2004 study shows that more than 60% of Germans agreed with the 
statement that they were tired of being told about the crimes against Jews, and they were angry 
that Germans were still considered responsible for them (Bergmann 2008, 45).  These findings 
would suggest that shifting the blame for antisemitism onto Muslims relieves mainstream 
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Germans of guilt, makes them feel vindicated as honorable opponents of antisemitism, and 
depicts Muslim Europeans as dishonorable and undeserving residents. 
It is important to acknowledge that the export-import theory of antisemitism accuses 
Muslims of being carriers of antisemitism, but attributes its origin to Europeans and more 
specifically to Germans. The theory blames Muslims for holding onto an antisemitism that 
European missionaries and German Nazis taught them in the first place. Turkish and Arab 
cultures are depicted as quick to learn antisemitism but not equipped with the moral fiber 
necessary to regret it. Antisemitism prevention reports fault Turks for holding onto a myth of 
tolerance towards Jews that makes them wrongly feel superior to Europeans. The same reports 
criticize Arabs for clinging to a mistaken sense of victimhood as well as an ill-founded desire for 
power and pride. The antisemitism prevention programs designed for Muslims aim to break 
down these self-perceptions. Turkish-background Germans are told that their forefathers were 
not really virtuous to Jews, and Arab-background Germans, specifically Palestinians, are taught 
that their Arab grandfathers collaborated with the Nazis and then sold their land to Jewish 
settlers. The export-import theory attributes the origins of antisemitism to Europeans, but it 
stresses the inadequacies of Turkish and Arab cultures, posing them as obstacles to a proper, or 
properly European, repentence.   
 Understanding antisemitism as a malignant ideology brought back to Europe by Muslims 
produces perpetrators out of marginalized, racialized, and disadvantaged people. When it is 
established that Muslims are antisemitic – and worse, do not atone for it – it becomes difficult to 
recognize their victim position in relation to European racism. Critical race theorists of Europe 
have already pointed out that European variants of racism are built on an ideology of a racial 
blindness that persistently ignores contemporary racial differences and, as a result, is oblivious to 
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ongoing racist practices in Europe. They also agree that the memory of the extreme 
manifestation of racism that led to the Holocaust is partly responsible for this racial blindness, 
and hence blindness to racism (Goldberg 2006, El-Tayeb 2008, Partridge 2010).  In that respect, 
the discourse of Muslim antisemitism works in a similar fashion to its sister discourses about 
Muslim sexism (Ewing 2008) and Muslim homophobia (Puar 2007), each of which characterizes 
Muslims as immoral perpetrators and exclude them from the fold of the ethically normative 
European/German community. Complex processes that have recently moved the fight against 
antisemitism to the center of European identity have distinguished this form of racism from all 
others, but especially from anti-Muslim racism. Depicting Muslims as past and present offenders 
against Jews, doing so officially and as part of a consistent educational policy, serves to conceal 
the subtle and not so subtle ways in which Muslims are victims of racism in today’s Europe.   
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